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Architecture Porting Guide

An architecture port is needed to enable Zephyr to run on an ISA or an ABI that is not currently supported.

The following are examples of ISAs and ABIs that Zephyr supports:

  • x86_32 ISA with System V ABI

  • ARMv7-M ISA with Thumb2 instruction set and ARM Embedded ABI (aeabi)

  • ARCv2 ISA

For information on Kconfig configuration, see Setting Kconfig configuration values. Architectures use a Kconfig configuration scheme similar to boards.

An architecture port can be divided in several parts; most are required and some are optional:

  • The early boot sequence: each architecture has different steps it must take when the CPU comes out of reset (required).

  • Interrupt and exception handling: each architecture handles asynchronous and unrequested events in a specific manner (required).

  • Thread context switching: the Zephyr context switch is dependent on the ABI and each ISA has a different set of registers to save (required).

  • Thread creation and termination: A thread’s initial stack frame is ABI and architecture-dependent, and thread abortion possibly as well (required).

  • Device drivers: most often, the system clock timer and the interrupt controller are tied to the architecture (some required, some optional).

  • Utility libraries: some common kernel APIs rely on a architecture-specific implementation for performance reasons (required).

  • CPU idling/power management: most architectures implement instructions for putting the CPU to sleep (partly optional, most likely very desired).

  • Fault management: for implementing architecture-specific debug help and handling of fatal error in threads (partly optional).

  • Linker scripts and toolchains: architecture-specific details will most likely be needed in the build system and when linking the image (required).

  • Memory Management and Memory Mapping: for architecture-specific details on supporting memory management and memory mapping.

  • Stack Objects: for architecture-specific details on memory protection hardware regarding stack objects.

  • User Mode Threads: for supporting threads in user mode.

  • GDB Stub: for supporting GDB stub to enable remote debugging.

Early Boot Sequence

The goal of the early boot sequence is to take the system from the state it is after reset to a state where is can run C code and thus the common kernel initialization sequence. Most of the time, very few steps are needed, while some architectures require a bit more work to be performed.

Common steps for all architectures:

  • Setup an initial stack.

  • If running an XIP kernel, copy initialized data from ROM to RAM.

  • If not using an ELF loader, zero the BSS section.

  • Jump to z_cstart(), the early kernel initialization

    • z_cstart() is responsible for context switching out of the fake context running at startup into the main thread.

Some examples of architecture-specific steps that have to be taken:

  • If given control in real mode on x86_32, switch to 32-bit protected mode.

  • Setup the segment registers on x86_32 to handle boot loaders that leave them in an unknown or broken state.

  • Initialize a board-specific watchdog on Cortex-M3/4.

  • Switch stacks from MSP to PSP on Cortex-M.

  • Use a different approach than calling into _Swap() on Cortex-M to prevent race conditions.

  • Setup FIRQ and regular IRQ handling on ARCv2.

Interrupt and Exception Handling

Each architecture defines interrupt and exception handling differently.

When a device wants to signal the processor that there is some work to be done on its behalf, it raises an interrupt. When a thread does an operation that is not handled by the serial flow of the software itself, it raises an exception. Both, interrupts and exceptions, pass control to a handler. The handler is known as an ISR in the case of interrupts. The handler performs the work required by the exception or the interrupt. For interrupts, that work is device-specific. For exceptions, it depends on the exception, but most often the core kernel itself is responsible for providing the handler.

The kernel has to perform some work in addition to the work the handler itself performs. For example:

  • Prior to handing control to the handler:

    • Save the currently executing context.

    • Possibly getting out of power saving mode, which includes waking up devices.

    • Updating the kernel uptime if getting out of tickless idle mode.

  • After getting control back from the handler:

    • Decide whether to perform a context switch.

    • When performing a context switch, restore the context being context switched in.

This work is conceptually the same across architectures, but the details are completely different:

  • The registers to save and restore.

  • The processor instructions to perform the work.

  • The numbering of the exceptions.

  • etc.

It thus needs an architecture-specific implementation, called the interrupt/exception stub.

Another issue is that the kernel defines the signature of ISRs as:

void (*isr)(void *parameter)

Architectures do not have a consistent or native way of handling parameters to an ISR. As such there are two commonly used methods for handling the parameter.

  • Using some architecture defined mechanism, the parameter value is forced in the stub. This is commonly found in X86-based architectures.

  • The parameters to the ISR are inserted and tracked via a separate table requiring the architecture to discover at runtime which interrupt is executing. A common interrupt handler demuxer is installed for all entries of the real interrupt vector table, which then fetches the device’s ISR and parameter from the separate table. This approach is commonly used in the ARC and ARM architectures via the CONFIG_GEN_ISR_TABLES implementation. You can find examples of the stubs by looking at _interrupt_enter() in x86, _IntExit() in ARM, _isr_wrapper() in ARM, or the full implementation description for ARC in arch/arc/core/isr_wrapper.S.

Each architecture also has to implement primitives for interrupt control:

Note

IRQ_CONNECT is a macro that uses assembler and/or linker script tricks to connect interrupts at build time, saving boot time and text size.

The vector table should contain a handler for each interrupt and exception that can possibly occur. The handler can be as simple as a spinning loop. However, we strongly suggest that handlers at least print some debug information. The information helps figuring out what went wrong when hitting an exception that is a fault, like divide-by-zero or invalid memory access, or an interrupt that is not expected (spurious interrupt). See the ARM implementation in arch/arm/core/cortex_m/fault.c for an example.

Thread Context Switching

Multi-threading is the basic purpose to have a kernel at all. Zephyr supports two types of threads: preemptible and cooperative.

Two crucial concepts when writing an architecture port are the following:

  • Cooperative threads run at a higher priority than preemptible ones, and always preempt them.

  • After handling an interrupt, if a cooperative thread was interrupted, the kernel always goes back to running that thread, since it is not preemptible.

A context switch can happen in several circumstances:

  • When a thread executes a blocking operation, such as taking a semaphore that is currently unavailable.

  • When a preemptible thread unblocks a thread of higher priority by releasing the object on which it was blocked.

  • When an interrupt unblocks a thread of higher priority than the one currently executing, if the currently executing thread is preemptible.

  • When a thread runs to completion.

  • When a thread causes a fatal exception and is removed from the running threads. For example, referencing invalid memory,

Therefore, the context switching must thus be able to handle all these cases.

The kernel keeps the next thread to run in a “cache”, and thus the context switching code only has to fetch from that cache to select which thread to run.

There are two types of context switches: cooperative and preemptive.

  • A cooperative context switch happens when a thread willfully gives the control to another thread. There are two cases where this happens

    • When a thread explicitly yields.

    • When a thread tries to take an object that is currently unavailable and is willing to wait until the object becomes available.

  • A preemptive context switch happens either because an ISR or a thread causes an operation that schedules a thread of higher priority than the one currently running, if the currently running thread is preemptible. An example of such an operation is releasing an object on which the thread of higher priority was waiting.

Note

Control is never taken from cooperative thread when one of them is the running thread.

A cooperative context switch is always done by having a thread call the _Swap() kernel internal symbol. When _Swap is called, the kernel logic knows that a context switch has to happen: _Swap does not check to see if a context switch must happen. Rather, _Swap decides what thread to context switch in. _Swap is called by the kernel logic when an object being operated on is unavailable, and some thread yielding/sleeping primitives.

Note

On x86 and Nios2, _Swap is generic enough and the architecture flexible enough that _Swap can be called when exiting an interrupt to provoke the context switch. This should not be taken as a rule, since neither the ARM Cortex-M or ARCv2 port do this.

Since _Swap is cooperative, the caller-saved registers from the ABI are already on the stack. There is no need to save them in the k_thread structure.

A context switch can also be performed preemptively. This happens upon exiting an ISR, in the kernel interrupt exit stub:

  • _interrupt_enter on x86 after the handler is called.

  • _IntExit on ARM.

  • _firq_exit and _rirq_exit on ARCv2.

In this case, the context switch must only be invoked when the interrupted thread was preemptible, not when it was a cooperative one, and only when the current interrupt is not nested.

The kernel also has the concept of “locking the scheduler”. This is a concept similar to locking the interrupts, but lighter-weight since interrupts can still occur. If a thread has locked the scheduler, is it temporarily non-preemptible.

So, the decision logic to invoke the context switch when exiting an interrupt is simple:

  • If the interrupted thread is not preemptible, do not invoke it.

  • Else, fetch the cached thread from the ready queue, and:

    • If the cached thread is not the current thread, invoke the context switch.

    • Else, do not invoke it.

This is simple, but crucial: if this is not implemented correctly, the kernel will not function as intended and will experience bizarre crashes, mostly due to stack corruption.

Note

If running a coop-only system, i.e. if CONFIG_NUM_PREEMPT_PRIORITIES is 0, no preemptive context switch ever happens. The interrupt code can be optimized to not take any scheduling decision when this is the case.

Thread Creation and Termination

To start a new thread, a stack frame must be constructed so that the context switch can pop it the same way it would pop one from a thread that had been context switched out. This is to be implemented in an architecture-specific _new_thread internal routine.

The thread entry point is also not to be called directly, i.e. it should not be set as the PC for the new thread. Rather it must be wrapped in _thread_entry. This means that the PC in the stack frame shall be set to _thread_entry, and the thread entry point shall be passed as the first parameter to _thread_entry. The specifics of this depend on the ABI.

The need for an architecture-specific thread termination implementation depends on the architecture. There is a generic implementation, but it might not work for a given architecture.

One reason that has been encountered for having an architecture-specific implementation of thread termination is that aborting a thread might be different if aborting because of a graceful exit or because of an exception. This is the case for ARM Cortex-M, where the CPU has to be taken out of handler mode if the thread triggered a fatal exception, but not if the thread gracefully exits its entry point function.

This means implementing an architecture-specific version of k_thread_abort(), and setting the Kconfig option CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_THREAD_ABORT as needed for the architecture (e.g. see arch/arm/core/cortex_m/Kconfig).

Thread Local Storage

To enable thread local storage on a new architecture:

  1. Implement arch_tls_stack_setup() to setup the TLS storage area in stack. Refer to the toolchain documentation on how the storage area needs to be structured. Some helper functions can be used:

    • Function z_tls_data_size() returns the size needed for thread local variables (excluding any extra data required by toolchain and architecture).

    • Function z_tls_copy() prepares the TLS storage area for thread local variables. This only copies the variable themselves and does not do architecture and/or toolchain specific data.

  2. In the context switching, grab the tls field inside the new thread’s struct k_thread and put it into an appropriate register (or some other variable) for access to the TLS storage area. Refer to toolchain and architecture documentation on which registers to use.

  3. In kconfig, add select CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_THREAD_LOCAL_STORAGE to kconfig related to the new architecture.

  4. Run the tests/kernel/threads/tls to make sure the new code works.

Device Drivers

The kernel requires very few hardware devices to function. In theory, the only required device is the interrupt controller, since the kernel can run without a system clock. In practice, to get access to most, if not all, of the sanity check test suite, a system clock is needed as well. Since these two are usually tied to the architecture, they are part of the architecture port.

Interrupt Controllers

There can be significant differences between the interrupt controllers and the interrupt concepts across architectures.

For example, x86 has the concept of an IDT and different interrupt controllers. The position of an interrupt in the IDT determines its priority.

On the other hand, the ARM Cortex-M has the NVIC as part of the architecture definition. There is no need for an IDT-like table that is separate from the NVIC vector table. The position in the table has nothing to do with priority of an IRQ: priorities are programmable per-entry.

The ARCv2 has its interrupt unit as part of the architecture definition, which is somewhat similar to the NVIC. However, where ARC defines interrupts as having a one-to-one mapping between exception and interrupt numbers (i.e. exception 1 is IRQ1, and device IRQs start at 16), ARM has IRQ0 being equivalent to exception 16 (and weirdly enough, exception 1 can be seen as IRQ-15).

All these differences mean that very little, if anything, can be shared between architectures with regards to interrupt controllers.

System Clock

x86 has APIC timers and the HPET as part of its architecture definition. ARM Cortex-M has the SYSTICK exception. Finally, ARCv2 has the timer0/1 device.

Kernel timeouts are handled in the context of the system clock timer driver’s interrupt handler.

Console Over Serial Line

There is one other device that is almost a requirement for an architecture port, since it is so useful for debugging. It is a simple polling, output-only, serial port driver on which to send the console (printk, printf) output.

It is not required, and a RAM console (CONFIG_RAM_CONSOLE) can be used to send all output to a circular buffer that can be read by a debugger instead.

Utility Libraries

The kernel depends on a few functions that can be implemented with very few instructions or in a lock-less manner in modern processors. Those are thus expected to be implemented as part of an architecture port.

  • Atomic operators.

  • Find-least-significant-bit-set and find-most-significant-bit-set.

    • If instructions do not exist for a given architecture, it is always possible to implement these functions as generic C functions.

It is possible to use compiler built-ins to implement these, but be careful they use the required compiler barriers.

CPU Idling/Power Management

The kernel provides support for CPU power management with two functions: arch_cpu_idle() and arch_cpu_atomic_idle().

arch_cpu_idle() can be as simple as calling the power saving instruction for the architecture with interrupts unlocked, for example hlt on x86, wfi or wfe on ARM, sleep on ARC. This function can be called in a loop within a context that does not care if it get interrupted or not by an interrupt before going to sleep. There are basically two scenarios when it is correct to use this function:

  • In a single-threaded system, in the only thread when the thread is not used for doing real work after initialization, i.e. it is sitting in a loop doing nothing for the duration of the application.

  • In the idle thread.

arch_cpu_atomic_idle(), on the other hand, must be able to atomically re-enable interrupts and invoke the power saving instruction. It can thus be used in real application code, again in single-threaded systems.

Normally, idling the CPU should be left to the idle thread, but in some very special scenarios, these APIs can be used by applications.

Both functions must exist for a given architecture. However, the implementation can be simply the following steps, if desired:

  1. unlock interrupts

  2. NOP

However, a real implementation is strongly recommended.

Fault Management

In the event of an unhandled CPU exception, the architecture code must call into z_fatal_error(). This function dumps out architecture-agnostic information and makes a policy decision on what to do next by invoking k_sys_fatal_error(). This function can be overridden to implement application-specific policies that could include locking interrupts and spinning forever (the default implementation) or even powering off the system (if supported).

Toolchain and Linking

Toolchain support has to be added to the build system.

Some architecture-specific definitions are needed in include/zephyr/toolchain/gcc.h. See what exists in that file for currently supported architectures.

Each architecture also needs its own linker script, even if most sections can be derived from the linker scripts of other architectures. Some sections might be specific to the new architecture, for example the SCB section on ARM and the IDT section on x86.

Memory Management and Memory Mapping

If the target platform enables paging and requires drivers to memory-map their I/O regions, CONFIG_MMU needs to be enabled and the following API implemented:

Stack Objects

The presence of memory protection hardware affects how stack objects are created. All architecture ports must specify the required alignment of the stack pointer, which is some combination of CPU and ABI requirements. This is defined in architecture headers with ARCH_STACK_PTR_ALIGN and is typically something small like 4, 8, or 16 bytes.

Two types of thread stacks exist:

  • “kernel” stacks defined with K_KERNEL_STACK_DEFINE() and related APIs, which can host kernel threads running in supervisor mode or used as the stack for interrupt/exception handling. These have significantly relaxed alignment requirements and use less reserved data. No memory is reserved for privilege elevation stacks.

  • “thread” stacks which typically use more memory, but are capable of hosting thread running in user mode, as well as any use-cases for kernel stacks.

If CONFIG_USERSPACE is not enabled, “thread” and “kernel” stacks are equivalent.

Additional macros may be defined in the architecture layer to specify the alignment of the base of stack objects, any reserved data inside the stack object not used for the thread’s stack buffer, and how to round up stack sizes to support user mode threads. In the absence of definitions some defaults are assumed:

All stack creation macros are defined in terms of these.

Stack objects all have the following layout, with some regions potentially zero-sized depending on configuration. There are always two main parts: reserved memory at the beginning, and then the stack buffer itself. The bounds of some areas can only be determined at runtime in the context of its associated thread object. Other areas are entirely computable at build time.

Some architectures may need to carve-out reserved memory at runtime from the stack buffer, instead of unconditionally reserving it at build time, or to supplement an existing reserved area (as is the case with the ARM FPU). Such carve-outs will always be tracked in thread.stack_info.start. The region specified by thread.stack_info.start and thread.stack_info.size is always fully accessible by a user mode thread. thread.stack_info.delta denotes an offset which can be used to compute the initial stack pointer from the very end of the stack object, taking into account storage for TLS and ASLR random offsets.

+---------------------+ <- thread.stack_obj
| Reserved Memory     | } K_(THREAD|KERNEL)_STACK_RESERVED
+---------------------+
| Carved-out memory   |
|.....................| <- thread.stack_info.start
| Unused stack buffer |
|                     |
|.....................| <- thread's current stack pointer
| Used stack buffer   |
|                     |
|.....................| <- Initial stack pointer. Computable
| ASLR Random offset  |      with thread.stack_info.delta
+---------------------| <- thread.userspace_local_data
| Thread-local data   |
+---------------------+ <- thread.stack_info.start + thread.stack_info.size

At present, Zephyr does not support stacks that grow upward.

No Memory Protection

If no memory protection is in use, then the defaults are sufficient.

HW-based stack overflow detection

This option uses hardware features to generate a fatal error if a thread in supervisor mode overflows its stack. This is useful for debugging, although for a couple reasons, you can’t reliably make any assertions about the state of the system after this happens:

  • The kernel could have been inside a critical section when the overflow occurs, leaving important global data structures in a corrupted state.

  • For systems that implement stack protection using a guard memory region, it’s possible to overshoot the guard and corrupt adjacent data structures before the hardware detects this situation.

To enable the CONFIG_HW_STACK_PROTECTION feature, the system must provide some kind of hardware-based stack overflow protection, and enable the CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_STACK_PROTECTION option.

Two forms of HW-based stack overflow detection are supported: dedicated CPU features for this purpose, or special read-only guard regions immediately preceding stack buffers.

CONFIG_HW_STACK_PROTECTION only catches stack overflows for supervisor threads. This is not required to catch stack overflow from user threads; CONFIG_USERSPACE is orthogonal.

This feature only detects supervisor mode stack overflows, including stack overflows when handling system calls. It doesn’t guarantee that the kernel has not been corrupted. Any stack overflow in supervisor mode should be treated as a fatal error, with no assertions about the integrity of the overall system possible.

Stack overflows in user mode are recoverable (from the kernel’s perspective) and require no special configuration; CONFIG_HW_STACK_PROTECTION only applies to catching overflows when the CPU is in supervisor mode.

CPU-based stack overflow detection

If we are detecting stack overflows in supervisor mode via special CPU registers (like ARM’s SPLIM), then the defaults are sufficient.

Guard-based stack overflow detection

We are detecting supervisor mode stack overflows via special memory protection region located immediately before the stack buffer that generates an exception on write. Reserved memory will be used for the guard region.

ARCH_KERNEL_STACK_RESERVED should be defined to the minimum size of a memory protection region. On most ARM CPUs this is 32 bytes. ARCH_KERNEL_STACK_OBJ_ALIGN should also be set to the required alignment for this region.

MMU-based systems should not reserve RAM for the guard region and instead simply leave an non-present virtual page below every stack when it is mapped into the address space. The stack object will still need to be properly aligned and sized to page granularity.

+-----------------------------+ <- thread.stack_obj
| Guard reserved memory       | } K_KERNEL_STACK_RESERVED
+-----------------------------+
| Guard carve-out             |
|.............................| <- thread.stack_info.start
| Stack buffer                |
.                             .

Guard carve-outs for kernel stacks are uncommon and should be avoided if possible. They tend to be needed for two situations:

  • The same stack may be re-purposed to host a user thread, in which case the guard is unnecessary and shouldn’t be unconditionally reserved. This is the case when privilege elevation stacks are not inside the stack object.

  • The required guard size is variable and depends on context. For example, some ARM CPUs have lazy floating point stacking during exceptions and may decrement the stack pointer by a large value without writing anything, completely overshooting a minimally-sized guard and corrupting adjacent memory. Rather than unconditionally reserving a larger guard, the extra memory is carved out if the thread uses floating point.

User mode enabled

Enabling user mode activates two new requirements:

  • A separate fixed-sized privilege mode stack, specified by CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE, must be allocated that the user thread cannot access. It is used as the stack by the kernel when handling system calls. If stack guards are implemented, a stack guard region must be able to be placed before it, with support for carve-outs if necessary.

  • The memory protection hardware must be able to program a region that exactly covers the thread’s stack buffer, tracked in thread.stack_info. This implies that ARCH_THREAD_STACK_SIZE_ADJUST() will need to round up the requested stack size so that a region may cover it, and that ARCH_THREAD_STACK_OBJ_ALIGN() is also specified per the granularity of the memory protection hardware.

This becomes more complicated if the memory protection hardware requires that all memory regions be sized to a power of two, and aligned to their own size. This is common on older MPUs and is known with CONFIG_MPU_REQUIRES_POWER_OF_TWO_ALIGNMENT.

thread.stack_info always tracks the user-accessible part of the stack object, it must always be correct to program a memory protection region with user access using the range stored within.

Non power-of-two memory region requirements

On systems without power-of-two region requirements, the reserved memory area for threads stacks defined by K_THREAD_STACK_RESERVED may be used to contain the privilege mode stack. The layout could be something like:

+------------------------------+ <- thread.stack_obj
| Other platform data          |
+------------------------------+
| Guard region (if enabled)    |
+------------------------------+
| Guard carve-out (if needed)  |
|..............................|
| Privilege elevation stack    |
+------------------------------| <- thread.stack_obj +
| Stack buffer                 |      K_THREAD_STACK_RESERVED =
.                              .      thread.stack_info.start

The guard region, and any carve-out (if needed) would be configured as a read-only region when the thread is created.

  • If the thread is a supervisor thread, the privilege elevation region is just extra stack memory. An overflow will eventually crash into the guard region.

  • If the thread is running in user mode, a memory protection region will be configured to allow user threads access to the stack buffer, but nothing before or after it. An overflow in user mode will crash into the privilege elevation stack, which the user thread has no access to. An overflow when handling a system call will crash into the guard region.

On an MMU system there should be no physical guards; the privilege mode stack will be mapped into kernel memory, and the stack buffer in the user part of memory, each with non-present virtual guard pages below them to catch runtime stack overflows.

Other platform data may be stored before the guard region, but this is highly discouraged if such data could be stored in thread.arch somewhere.

ARCH_THREAD_STACK_RESERVED will need to be defined to capture the size of the reserved region containing platform data, privilege elevation stacks, and guards. It must be appropriately sized such that an MPU region to grant user mode access to the stack buffer can be placed immediately after it.

Power-of-two memory region requirements

Thread stack objects must be sized and aligned to the same power of two, without any reserved memory to allow efficient packing in memory. Thus, any guards in the thread stack must be completely carved out, and the privilege elevation stack must be allocated elsewhere.

ARCH_THREAD_STACK_SIZE_ADJUST() and ARCH_THREAD_STACK_OBJ_ALIGN() should both be defined to Z_POW2_CEIL(). K_THREAD_STACK_RESERVED must be 0.

For the privilege stacks, the CONFIG_GEN_PRIV_STACKS must be, enabled. For every thread stack found in the system, a corresponding fixed-size kernel stack used for handling system calls is generated. The address of the privilege stacks can be looked up quickly at runtime based on the thread stack address using z_priv_stack_find(). These stacks are laid out the same way as other kernel-only stacks.

+-----------------------------+ <- z_priv_stack_find(thread.stack_obj)
| Reserved memory             | } K_KERNEL_STACK_RESERVED
+-----------------------------+
| Guard carve-out (if needed) |
|.............................|
| Privilege elevation stack   |
|                             |
+-----------------------------+ <- z_priv_stack_find(thread.stack_obj) +
                                     K_KERNEL_STACK_RESERVED +
                                     CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE

+-----------------------------+ <- thread.stack_obj
| MPU guard carve-out         |
| (supervisor mode only)      |
|.............................| <- thread.stack_info.start
| Stack buffer                |
.                             .

The guard carve-out in the thread stack object is only used if the thread is running in supervisor mode. If the thread drops to user mode, there is no guard and the entire object is used as the stack buffer, with full access to the associated user mode thread and thread.stack_info updated appropriately.

User Mode Threads

To support user mode threads, several kernel-to-arch APIs need to be implemented, and the system must enable the CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USERSPACE option. Please see the documentation for each of these functions for more details:

  • arch_buffer_validate() to test whether the current thread has access permissions to a particular memory region

  • arch_user_mode_enter() which will irreversibly drop a supervisor thread to user mode privileges. The stack must be wiped.

  • arch_syscall_oops() which generates a kernel oops when system call parameters can’t be validated, in such a way that the oops appears to be generated from where the system call was invoked in the user thread

  • arch_syscall_invoke0() through arch_syscall_invoke6() invoke a system call with the appropriate number of arguments which must all be passed in during the privilege elevation via registers.

  • arch_is_user_context() return nonzero if the CPU is currently running in user mode

  • arch_mem_domain_max_partitions_get() which indicates the max number of regions for a memory domain. MMU systems have an unlimited amount, MPU systems have constraints on this.

Some architectures may need to update software memory management structures or modify hardware registers on another CPU when memory domain APIs are invoked. If so, CONFIG_ARCH_MEM_DOMAIN_SYNCHRONOUS_API must be selected by the architecture and some additional APIs must be implemented. This is common on MMU systems and uncommon on MPU systems:

  • arch_mem_domain_thread_add()

  • arch_mem_domain_thread_remove()

  • arch_mem_domain_partition_add()

  • arch_mem_domain_partition_remove()

Please see the doxygen documentation of these APIs for details.

In addition to implementing these APIs, there are some other tasks as well:

  • _new_thread() needs to spawn threads with K_USER in user mode

  • On context switch, the outgoing thread’s stack memory should be marked inaccessible to user mode by making the appropriate configuration changes in the memory management hardware.. The incoming thread’s stack memory should likewise be marked as accessible. This ensures that threads can’t mess with other thread stacks.

  • On context switch, the system needs to switch between memory domains for the incoming and outgoing threads.

  • Thread stack areas must include a kernel stack region. This should be inaccessible to user threads at all times. This stack will be used when system calls are made. This should be fixed size for all threads, and must be large enough to handle any system call.

  • A software interrupt or some kind of privilege elevation mechanism needs to be established. This is closely tied to how the _arch_syscall_invoke macros are implemented. On system call, the appropriate handler function needs to be looked up in _k_syscall_table. Bad system call IDs should jump to the K_SYSCALL_BAD handler. Upon completion of the system call, care must be taken not to leak any register state back to user mode.

GDB Stub

To enable GDB stub for remote debugging on a new architecture:

  1. Create a new gdbstub.h header file under appropriate architecture include directory (include/arch/<arch>/gdbstub.h).

    • Create a new struct struct gdb_ctx as the GDB context.

      • Must define a member named exception of type unsigned int to store the GDB exception reason. This value needs to be set before entering z_gdb_main_loop().

      • Architecture can define as many members as needed for GDB stub to function.

      • Pointer to this struct needs to be passed to z_gdb_main_loop(), where this pointer will be passed to other GDB stub functions.

  2. Functions for entering and exiting GDB stub main loop.

    • If the architecture relies on interrupts to service breakpoints, interrupt service routines (ISR) need to be implemented, which will serve as the entry point to GDB stub main loop.

    • These functions need to save and restore context so code execution can continue as if no breakpoints have been encountered.

    • These functions need to call z_gdb_main_loop() after saving execution context to go into the GDB stub main loop to receive commands from GDB.

    • Before calling z_gdb_main_loop(), gdb_ctx.exception must be set to specify the exception reason.

  3. Implement necessary functions to support GDB stub functionality:

    • arch_gdb_init()

      • This needs to initialize necessary bits to support GDB stub functionality, for example, setting up the GDB context and connecting debug interrupts.

      • This must stop code execution via architecture specific method (e.g. raising debug interrupts). This allows GDB to connect during boot.

    • arch_gdb_continue()

      • This function is called when GDB sends a c or continue command to continue code execution.

    • arch_gdb_step()

      • This function is called when GDB sends a si or stepi command to execute one machine instruction, before returning to GDB prompt.

    • Hardware register read/write functions:

      • Since the GDB stub is running on the target, manipulation of hardware registers need to cached to avoid affecting the execution of GDB stub. Think of it as context switching, where the execution context is changed to the GDB stub. So that the register values of the running thread before context switch need to be stored. Manipulation of register values must only be done to this cached copy. The updated values will then be written to hardware registers before switching back to the previous running thread.

      • arch_gdb_reg_readall()

        • This collects all hardware register values that would appear in a g/G packets which will be sent back to GDB. The format of the G-packet is architecture specific. Consult GDB on what is expected.

        • Note that, for most architectures, a valid G-packet must be returned and sent to GDB. If a packet without incorrect length is sent to GDB, GDB will abort the debugging session.

      • arch_gdb_reg_writeall()

        • This takes a G-packet sent by GDB and populates the hardware registers with values from the G-packet.

      • arch_gdb_reg_readone()

        • This reads the value of one hardware register and sends the result to GDB.

      • arch_gdb_reg_writeone()

        • This writes the value of one hardware register received from GDB.

    • Breakpoints:

      • arch_gdb_add_breakpoint() and arch_gdb_remove_breakpoint()

      • GDB may decide to use software breakpoints which modifies the memory at the breakpoint locations to replace the instruction with software breakpoint or trap instructions. GDB will then restore the memory content once execution reaches the breakpoints. GDB supports this by default and there is usually no need to handle software breakpoints in the architecture code (where breakpoint type is 0).

      • Hardware breakpoints (type 1) are required if the code is in ROM or flash that cannot be modified at runtime. Consult the architecture datasheet on how to enable hardware breakpoints.

      • If hardware breakpoints are not supported by the architecture, there is no need to implement these in architecture code. GDB will then rely on software breakpoints.

  4. For architecture where certain memory regions are not accessible, an array named gdb_mem_region_array of type gdb_mem_region needs to be defined to specify regions that are accessible. For each array item:

API Reference

Timing

Architecture timing APIs

Threads

Architecture thread APIs
Architecture-specific Thread Local Storage APIs

Power Management

Architecture-specific power management APIs

Symmetric Multi-Processing

Architecture-specific SMP APIs

Interrupts

Architecture-specific IRQ APIs

Userspace

Architecture-specific userspace APIs

Memory Management

Architecture-specific memory-mapping APIs

Miscellaneous Architecture APIs

Miscellaneous architecture APIs

GDB Stub APIs

Architecture-specific gdbstub APIs